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The New Rule 10b-18:
How the Wachovia Merger Continues to Plague the Future of the
Banking Industry
I. INTRODUCTION

In September of 2001, Wachovia Corporation (Wachovia),
of Winston-Salem, North Carolina, and the former First Union
Corporation (First Union), of Charlotte, North Carolina, merged
to form Wachovia Corporation, N.A., a Charlotte-based financial
holding company.' For months, the merger appeared unlikely, and
was only consummated after the companies fended off a hostile
bid from SunTrust Banks, Inc. (SunTrust), of Atlanta, Georgia.2
To many in the banking industry, the challenge from SunTrust
came as no surprise.3 In fact, the Wachovia-First Union merger
became possible only after Wachovia abandoned a December 2000
merger with SunTrust just four days before the two banking giants
planned to announce the merger.4 The December announcement
shocked many, because not only did a Wachovia-SunTrust merger
appear to be "an almost perfect match," but SunTrust had agreed
to pay a twelve percent premium for Wachovia's stock, a far more
lucrative deal than First Union's initial offer.' What precipitated
Wachovia's balk on the eve of the announcement remains a secret,
but many now know that only four months after brushing off
SunTrust's overtures, Wachovia was set to merge with First
Union.6 In short, Wachovia had its chance to merge with SunTrust
1. See David Boracks, Wachovia Buyback Tactic Back to Haunt It?, AM.
BANKER, Apr. 1, 2003, at 1.

2. Chris Serres, SEC Investigating Wachovia's Trades, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, NC), Apr. 1, 2003, at D1.
3. See Nikhil Deogun & Carrick Mollenkamp, Deals & Dealmakers: Wachovia
Chief Faces Puzzled Shareholders,WALL ST. J., May 16, 2001, at Cl.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. Id. One attempt to explain the "December Surprise" has suggested that,
"disagreements over asset management were simply the final straw and symptomatic
of larger disagreements [between Wachovia and SunTrust]. The Wachovia side felt
that the SunTrust executives had proposed a merge of equals but were really
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but walked away from the deal at the last minute.7 Therefore,

when SunTrust returned with an unsolicited bid for Wachovia a
few months later, Wachovia and First Union countered with a
8
campaign to save their so-called "merger among equals.",
The cornerstone of Wachovia's counter-attack 9 was a
repurchase program that saw Wachovia purchase $4 million of its

own shares, as well as $552 million First Union shares, in the
spring of 2001." During this same season, First Union purchased
$67 million of its own shares.1 2 In addition to being significant
acquisitions, these repurchases played a major role in determining
the outcome of the proposed merger between First Union and
Wachovia. For instance, in May of 2001, before First Union and
Wachovia commenced the repurchasing campaign, SunTrust's bid
was 16.7% higher than First Union's. 3 But as of July 24, 2001, a
week before the shareholder vote on the competing proposals and
weeks after significant repurchasing activities by both Wachovia
and First Union, the spread between the competing bids had fallen

engineering a takeover with their viewpoints expected to prevail. There was an
increasing feeling among several top managers at Wachovia that SunTrust was simply
not the right partner." Id.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. In addition to the repurchases of common stock, Wachovia and First Union
took several other measures to deter a hostile offer. For instance, the merger
agreement gave "Wachovia and First Union options to purchase 19.9% stakes in one
another should a third party acquire Wachovia." See Deogun & Mollenkamp, supra
note 3, at Cl. More surprising, however, was that the clause permits "the banks to use
cash or other assets to buy that stake. Thus, First Union could exercise the option,
which carries a value of about $2.5 billion," and "purchase the option with an
equivalent amount of bad loans or other assets." Id. Such a provision seems to be
calculated to prevent a hostile takeover, by requiring a third-party acquiror to assume
assets of dubious value in the event of a takeover. Id. In addition, if shareholders vote
against the First Union-Wachovia merger, the merger agreement would prevent
Wachovia from engaging in another merger until at least January of 2002. Id.
10. See Jesse Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender
Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 428-29 (2000). Under a repurchase or buyback
program, the entity that originally issued the stock purchases its own shares from its
shareholders. Id.
11. See Deogun & Mollenkamp, supra note 3, at C1.
12. See Rick Rothacker, Wachovia Probed by SEC Over Stock Buys, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Apr. 1, 2003, at 2D.
13. Carrick Mollenkamp, First Union Gains Support in Battle for Wachovia
Corp., WALL ST. J., July 24, 2001, at B6.
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to a mere six percent in favor of SunTrust.14 Thus, the more than
$600 million in repurchases of First Union stock during the
takeover conflict coincided with an escalation of First Union's
share price, thereby narrowing the differential between the
competing offers. 5 The spread between the competing offers
proved to be crucial, because the merger deal involved a $14
billion stock swap. 16 Since the basis of the deal was common stock,
the attractiveness of First Union's offer depended on the price of
its stock, which rose during the repurchasing period. Therefore,
without such significant repurchasing activity, First Union would
have been unable to present Wachovia's shareholders with an
offer comparable to SunTrust's unsolicited bid.17
In addition to prompting an investigation by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (Commission) into the legality of the
repurchases, 8 the actions of Wachovia and First Union also seem
to have been a motivating force in prompting the Commission to
revise the rule that facilitated these transactions. For instance, the
now amended Rule 10b-18 altered the definition of a Rule 10b-18
purchase to exclude repurchases "effected during the period from
the time of public announcement of the merger, acquisition, or
similar transaction involving a recapitalization, until the
completion of such transaction."' 9 First Union initiated the stock
repurchasing activities after it had joined with Wachovia in
publicly announcing the merger.2" As a result, under the new
regime, First Union would have been unable to engage in the
significant repurchasing activities that allowed its offer to remain
14. See id.
15. Karen Holliday, How the War for Wachovia was Won, FIN. EXECUTIVE, Jan.
1, 2002, at 30.
16. See id.
17. See id. During the period when First Union was repurchasing its own stock,
Sun Trust was prohibited from taking similar action because attorneys for First
Union successfully petitioned the SEC to bar SunTrust from buying its own stock
during the proxy solicitation. Thus, value of SunTrust's unsolicited bid remained flat,
allowing First Union to close the price differential between the two offers. See
Robert Lennon, The Multitasker, AM. LAW. Apr. 7, 2002, at 80.
18. Rothaker, supra note 12, at 2D.
19. Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 68 Fed. Reg.
64,952, 64,954-55 (Nov. 17, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240,10b18(a)(13)(iv)).
20. Rothaker, supra note 12, at 2D.
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competitive against the SunTrust overture. The Commission's
justification for extending the blackout period to the public
announcement of a merger is simple: "Once a merger or
acquisition is announced, an issuer has considerable incentive to
support or raise the market price of its stock in order to facilitate
the merger or acquisition."2 In justifying this conclusion, the
Commission cites a "recent contested takeover [where] banks
repurchased their respective securities in order to boost their stock
22
price to enhance the value of their competing merger proposals.,
Thus, in addition to prompting an SEC investigation,23 the First
Union-Wachovia buyback activities initiated the Commission's
amendment of Rule 10b-18. 24
Unfortunately, the Commission did not stop with
preventing merging parties from using the rule's safe harbor to
avoid charges of manipulation. It went further in tinkering with
the rest of the Rule, even though these additional provisions do
not aid improper stock price boosting in the context of mergers.26
Therefore, the amended rule does more than proscribe the
behavior of Wachovia and First Union. It eliminates the block
exception to the volume condition, thereby favoring large issuers
while placing companies whose stock is thinly-traded at a
competitive disadvantage.
Since 1982, issuers have been able to make block
repurchases of their common stock under the safe harbor of Rule

21. Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 68 Fed. Reg.
at 64,955.
22. Id.
23. Rothaker, supra note 12.
24. Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 68 Fed. Reg.
at 64,955.
25. Since repurchases can produce fluctuation in an issuer's securities, some may
claim that the repurchases were effected to manipulate the market price. Rule 10b18 and Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 67 Fed. Reg.
77,594, 77,594 (Dec. 18, 2002). As a result, Rule 10b-18 provides a safe harbor for
repurchases that satisfy, on a daily basis, the conditions set out in the Rule regarding
timing, price, volume and manner conditions. See infra note 41 and accompanying
text.
26. The other provisions amended by the Commission include the elimination of
the block exception from the volume condition. See Purchases of Certain Equity
Securities by the Issuer and Others, 68 Fed. Reg. at 64,958-60 (Nov. 17, 2003) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18).
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10b-18.

In December of 2002, the Commission released a
proposal that would erase this "block exception" regulation from
the pages of the Code of Federal Regulations.28 The Commission
based its reversal of policy on the presumption that "the block
exception may allow issuers to dominate the market for their
securities in a way not originally contemplated by the safe
harbor., 29
Thus, the Commission concluded that modern
conditions have raised "the possibility that investors could be
misled about the integrity of the securities trading market as an
independent pricing mechanism."30 The Commission followed
through on its proposal in December of 2003 when it amended
Rule 10b-18 to eliminate the block exception, with one significant
caveat that fails to adequately remedy the concerns raised in this
note.3 ' In addressing these concerns, however, the Commission
failed to cite any evidence that the block exception led to market
manipulation in the more than twenty years since the safe harbor
came into existence.
Due to the burden placed on issuers whose stock is thinly
traded and the existence of more reasonable alternatives to the
Commission's Rule, the Commission should either abandon the
change or enact one of the proposals suggested herein as a more
beneficial alternative to address the Commission's concerns.
Part II of this article examines the original form of Rule
10b-18 and the conditions an issuer must meet for a repurchase to
fall within the confines of the Rule's safe harbor.32 Part III
considers the Amended Rule, the adverse effects this Rule will
have on the banking industry, and various alternatives to the
rule.33

27. See Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-18 (2003).
28. Rule 10b-18 and Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and
Others, 67 Fed. Reg., at 77,599.
29. Id. at 77,600 (emphasis added).
30. Id.
31. See Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 64,960.
32. See infra notes 34-67 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 58-136 and accompanying text. Specifically, Part III confines
its examination to the block purchase and the volume limitation of the Current and
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II. THE ORIGINAL RULE 1OB-18

On November 26, 1982, the Commission adopted Rule 10b18 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."4 The rule provided
a safe harbor for companies that wish to repurchase their own
stock from investors. Compliance with the rule helped to assure
that certain anti-manipulative provisions of federal securities laws,
such as Rule 10b-5 35 and section 9(a)(2)36 are not violated solely by
reason of the volume, price, timing, or manner of the issuer's
repurchases of common stock." Compliance with Rule 10b-18 is
voluntary; issuers may repurchase their stock outside of the safe
harbor, but will not then benefit from its protections.38 Without the
protections of the safe harbor, the issuer carries the burden of

Proposed Rule, and the adverse affects the Proposed Rule would visit on the banking
industry. See infra notes 58-136 and accompanying text.
34. See Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by Issuer and Others, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-18 (2003).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Rule lob-5 prohibits
individuals and entities from directly or indirectly using a facility of
a national securities exchange: to employ any device, scheme or
artifice to defraud,... to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or... to engage in any act,
practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit on any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
Id.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (2001).
Section 9(a)(2) prohibits engaging in
manipulative conduct on any national securities exchange. Id.
37. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18(b).
38. Id. Before the adoption of Rule 10b-18, the Commission proposed Rule 13e2, a mandatory rule. Missy Piccioni, Note, A Regulatory Response by the Securities
and Exchange Commission to the Terrorist Attacks on America-Did the Issuer
Repurchase Relief Make a Difference?, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 565, 572-73 (2003). But
pursuant to research that revealed the often legitimate motives and benefits to
investors regarding issuer repurchases, the SEC abandoned the proposal for a
mandatory rule in favor of a rule that made compliance voluntary. See id. Thus, not
wishing to prevent legitimate issuer repurchase programs, the Commission created
the safe harbor of Rule 10b-18. Lloyd H. Feller & Mary Chamberlin, Issuer
Repurchases, REV. SEC. REG., Jan. 11, 1984, at 993-94. In addition to illustrating that
the current rule is less restrictive than the proposed, but never enacted predecessor,
this also demonstrates the initial policy that issuer repurchases should be allowed,
and even encouraged, absent persuasive evidence that the issuer seeks to manipulate
the market through repurchasing shares of its common stock. Id.
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proving that its acts were both non-fraudulent and nonmanipulative.
Only a "Rule 10b-18 purchase"39 is eligible for protection
against charges of market manipulation provided by the rule's safe
harbor.40 A Rule 10b-18 purchase "means a purchase of common
stock of an issuer by or for the issuer or any affiliated purchaser of
There are several exceptions to the rule's safe
the issuer."4
harbor, the most notable being that a repurchase "pursuantto a
merger, acquisition, or similar transaction involving a
recapitalization" falls outside of the safe harbor. 42
In addition to satisfying the definition of a rule purchase,
the transaction normally must meet the conditions regarding
volume, price, timing, and manner imposed by the Rule. 43 First, a
which
repurchase must meet the broker-dealer conditions,'
require all repurchases or bids to repurchase be made through the
same broker or dealer during a single trading day.45 Second, the
timing condition of Rule 10b-18 prohibits an issuer from
performing "the opening trade on any given day and [the issuer]
may not trade during the thirty minutes before the market
closes."46 The rationale for preventing repurchases during the last
half-hour of trading is a belief that this is the period when markets
are most volatile. 47 Third, the price for a repurchase or bid to
repurchase cannot be above either the highest current
39. Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-18(a)(3) (2003).
40. § 240.10b-18(b).
41. § 240.10b-18(a)(3).
42. § 240.10b-18(a)(3)(iv) (emphasis added).
43. If the issuer is repurchasing its common stock in the form of a block purchase,
the Old Rule excused compliance with the volume condition since the block
purchases were not subject to the twenty-five percent volume limitation, and the
block was excluded when calculating the security's ADTV (average daily trading
volume). See § 240.10b-18(b)(4).
44. § 240.10b-18(b)(1) (2003).
45. See Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-18(b)(1) (2003). "For purchasers to satisfy the 'safe harbor' they
must satisfy the following conditions: (1) [One broker or dealer] effects all Rule 10b18 purchases from or through only one broker on a single day, or if a broker is not
used, with only one dealer on a single day ..." Id.
46. § 240.10b-18(b)(2).
47. See Judith Burns, Deals & Deal Makers: SEC Considers Easing Rule on
CorporateStock Buybacks, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2002, at C5.

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 8

independent published bid or the last independent sale price.48
The preceding limitation finds support in the proposition that,
generally, the share price rises after an issuer announces its
intention to proceed with a buyback program.4 9 Thus, the price
condition seeks to ensure "that the issuer [would not lead] the
market for the security through its repurchases."5 Finally, the
volume of repurchases, not including block purchases,51 could not
exceed the higher of one round lot (100 shares)52 or twenty-five
percent of the average daily trading volume of the stock
(ADTV).53 Under Rule lOb-18, a block purchase is a quantity of
stock that (i) has a purchase price of $200,000 or more; (ii) consists
of 5,000 or more shares with a purchase price of at least $50,000;
(iii) is at least twenty round lots of a security that totals at least
150% of the daily trading volume for that security; or (iv) is at
least twenty round lots of the security and amounts to at least onetenth of one percent of the security's outstanding shares. 54 The last
condition excludes any shares owned by an affiliate, provided that
the necessary trading volume statistics are not readily available.55
If the issuer repurchased its common stock in the form of a block
purchase, the rule excused compliance with the volume condition.
48. See § 240.10b-18(b)(3).
49. See, e.g., David Ikenberry, et al., Market Underreactionto Open Market Share
Repurchases, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 181, 190-91 (1995) (suggesting that a firm's unexpected
announcement of a repurchase program may be viewed as a positive shock to its
stock price). An example of this positive shock phenomenon can be seen in the
repurchasing activity that coincided with the opening of the stock markets after the
September 1 1"hterrorist attacks. See Anita Raghavan, Team Effort: Banks and
Regulators Drew Together to Calm Markets After Attack, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2001,
at Al ("After huge losses in the week after the terrorist attacks, several stock indexes
stand just a shade below their Sept. 11 levels.... There are many reasons the market
stabilized, ranging from companies' stock buybacks to ordinary perception of value
by investors.").
50. Rule lOb-18 and Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and
Others, 67 Fed. Reg. at 77,595.
51. See Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-18(b)(4).
52. "The term round lot means 100 shares or other customary unit of trading for
a security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18(a)(13).
53. See § 240.10b-18(b)(4)(i). The average daily trading volume, hereinafter
referred to as ADTV, is the daily average of the reported volume for the security in
the four calendar weeks preceding the week that the rule purchase or bid is to be
initiated. See Piccioni, supra note 38, at 572.
54. See § 240.10b-18(a)(14).
55. See id.

2004]

NEW REGULATIONS

Block purchases were not subject to the twenty-five percent
volume limitation and the block was excluded when calculating the
security's ADTV.56 The Commission included a cap on volume
amid concerns that without such a limitation, an issuer could
dominate "the market for its securities through substantial
57
purchasing activity.
III. THE PROPOSAL TO REVISE RULE 1OB-18

In December 2002, the Commission released a proposal to
revise Rule 10b-1858 and, pursuant to the Commission's policy,
requested public comment on the proposed rule before final
approval of the changes.59 The proposed modifications apply to
the timing of the repurchases, as well as the volume and prices at
which an issuer may repurchase its securities while still falling
under the protective blanket of the rule's safe harbor.6" The
proposal. engendered instantaneous outcries from financial
institutions both large and small, financial holding companies, and
made strange bedfellows of Wal-Mart and the banking industry.
Such widespread and "principled opposition",6 1 to the proposal
should have given the Commission cause for concern, and
prompted an inquiry into the potentially irreversible and
devastating impact such changes would visit upon the banking
industry. Instead, the Commission approved an ill-conceived and
patchwork regulatory regime, while failing to take note of the
many objections or consider meaningful alternatives.

56. See Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-18(b)(4)(i) (2003).
57. See Rule 10b-18 and Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and
Others, 67 Fed. Reg. at 77,596.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See Todd Davenport, Frequent Buyers Worried About SEC Proposal, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 5 2003, at 7A.
61. Id.
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The Block Exception Proposal

Rule 10b-18, under its original form, excludes those
repurchases known as block purchases 62 from the volume
limitation that all other repurchases must meet in order to fall

under the rule's safe harbor.63 Thus, an issuer may purchase a
block of its own stock and still be protected by the Rule's safe
harbor, though technically it is not complying with the volume

requirement. In a departure from the current rule, and over twenty
years of good faith reliance upon it, the Commission has
eliminated the original block exception to Rule 10b-18.'
The New Rule amends the volume limitation by including
block purchases in the calculation of a security's ADTV and the
concomitant twenty-five percent volume limitation. 65
As an

alternative to the twenty-five percent volume limitation, an issuer
could choose to repurchase 500 shares of its common stock per
day, if this amount is greater than the twenty-five percent
restriction.6 6 Third, the amendment applies "alternative volume
conditions (which are applicable only during the trading session
immediately following a market-wide trading suspension), by
increasing the 25% volume limitation to 100%.,,67 Finally, the New
Rule permits an issuer to make one block purchase per week
within the safe harbor, so long as the issuer does not conduct

62. See supra notes 22-41 and accompanying text. Generally, the block purchase
comes in two forms. See Fried, supra note 10, at 422. First, the issuer will conduct the
block purchase on the open market. See Piccioni, supra note 38, at 566. For instance,
a purchase may be conducted to fund employee stock option plans or to effect the
most optimal use of capital resources. See Ok-Rial Song, Hidden Social Costs of
Open Market Share Repurchases, 27 J. CORP. L. 425, 427 (2002). Second, a
"significant" number of repurchases are purchases that are "brought to [the issuer]
on an unsolicited basis." See UMB Financial Coporation Comment to Rule lOb-18
and Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others; SEC Release
No. 33-81600 (Feb. 18, 2003) [hereinafter UMB Financial Coporation] at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s75002/drrilingerl.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
63. See Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-18(b)(4) (2003). In short, the block exception allows an issuer to
purchase a block of its stock without complying with the volume limitation. Id.
64. See Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 68 Fed.
Reg. 64,952, 64,959-64,960 (Nov. 7, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18).
65. See id. at 64,598-59.
66. See id. at 64,959.
67. Id at 64,961.
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another Rule 10b-18 purchase on the day of the block activity.68
Thus, the proposal significantly reduces the amount of stock an
issuer can repurchase in a single day under the Rule 10b-18 safe
harbor.
B.

Reasons for the Amendment

According to the Commission, the current market
conditions no longer justify excluding block purchases from the
volume limitation. 69 The Commission based this conclusion on the
increased utilization of block purchases in the current markets,
and the absence of a limitation on the number of block purchases
that an issuer can make on a single trading day.7" Therefore, the
proposal aims to alleviate the Commission's concern that the block
exception could allow issuers to dominate the market for their
securities in a manner that the drafters of the safe harbor could not
have foreseen. 7
According to the Rule, the initial justification for exclusion
was that "the Commission viewed the market impact of block
purchases as being less than that of a series of smaller purchases
that, in the aggregate, are equal in size to a block but are
accomplished over a period of time and so could give the
impression to the market of multiple investment decisions to buy
and more likely affect the market price."7 " Recently, the
Commission's concern has evolved into a fear that "investors will
be misled about the integrity of the securities trading market as an
independent pricing mechanism,"73 if issuers utilize the block
exception to "dominate" the market for their securities. One
should hesitate before faulting the Commission for attempting to
restore investor confidence in the securities trading market. But
the current proposal would mark a return to the very scenario that
68. Id. at 64,960.
69. See Rule 10b-18 and Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and
Others, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,594, 77,599 (Dec. 18, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-18).
70. See id. at 77,599-600.
71. See id. at 77,600.
72. Id. at 77,599.
73. Id.

202
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the 1980 Commission sought to avoid in excluding the block
purchase from the volume limitation of the safe harbor. Thus, the
problem lies not in the Commission's goal, but in its assumption
that the securities trading market is an independent pricing
mechanism, as well as in its failure to consider the reality that the
block exception has proven beneficial to both issuers and the
market.74
In its proposal to amend the Rule, the Commission notes
that issuers use the safe harbor, as well as the block exception, to
manipulate the price of their securities.7"
Aside from the
Commission's failure to cite any evidence of such manipulation,
the Commission also errs in confusing an issuer's illegal desire to
boost the market price of its security with the necessary goal of
avoiding a significant downward pressure on the share price. For
instance, the block exception allows the issuer to provide liquidity
for institutional investors.76 Without the block mechanism, the
market might be unable to absorb such a large holding.77 Under
the New Rule, an issuer would be unable to acquire such a block,
and this inability "could put significant downward pressure on the
price of the issuer's stock."78 According to this explanation, the
block exception does not allow the issuer to raise the price of its
stock, but "relieve[s] or neutralize[s] the downward pressure on
the market price of its stock."79 Thus, the risk of manipulation in
74. Sullivan & Cromwell, L.L.P., Comment to Rule 10b-18 and Purchases of
Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others; SEC Release No. 34-41905 (Feb
26, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s75002/sullivanl.htm (last visited Feb.
7, 2004) [hereinafter Sullivan].
75. See, e.g., Rule 10b-18 and Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer
and Others, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,594, 77,600 (Dec. 18, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-18) (explaining that issuers have, during contested takeovers, purchased
significant chunks of stock via the block exception, thereby reducing the spread
between competing offers.) But one should note that the Commission prevents the
aforementioned behavior by tightening the definition of a merger for purposes of the
Rule, i.e., an issuer cannot repurchase its stock in any amount from the date of public
announcement until the merger is finalized. See supra note 19 and accompanying
text. If an issuer cannot conduct a repurchase program during the merger period,
then the original block exception will not assist a circumvention of the Rule. Put
another way, the elimination of the block exception is an unnecessary case of
overreaching.
76. See Sullivan, supra note 74, at 8.
77. Id.

78. Id.
79. Id.
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the absorption of the holdings of an institutional investor is,
contrary to the Commission's belief, relatively low. The illfounded charge of using the block exception to manipulate share
price proves to be nothing more than a mirage, and with that, a
cornerstone of the Commission's rationale falls to the wayside.
As some commentators have noted, federal securities laws
provide only minimal regulation of share repurchases, unless
undertaken as a counterattack to an unsolicited takeover bid.8°
Rule 10b-18 provides only an optional safe harbor, thus, the rule
still allows an issuer to repurchase as much of its stock as it
wants." Nevertheless, the Commission should have hesitated
before overhauling a rule on which issuers have relied for twenty
years, absent compelling evidence that issuers have been accessing
not only the Rule 10b-18 safe harbor, but the block exception, to
manipulate the share price. On the other hand, if such evidence
exists, the Commission should make a showing that its charges
have a sound basis. In addition, one must distinguish between
evidence of market manipulation pursuant to repurchases, and
manipulation undertaken through the block exception. Evidence
that an issuer is raising its share price does not necessarily mean
that such manipulation occurs via the block exception. For
instance, the issuer could be using the price, 82 or broker-dealer
limitation as a vehicle to exploit the market. In short, the
Commission should not just make a showing of illegal activity, but
produce evidence that the block exception is the loophole.
C.

Effect of the Amendment on Small FinancialInstitutions

The Commission's proposal to amend the Rule began by
conceding that, "[i]ssuers repurchase their securities for many
legitimate business reasons., 8 4 Among these "legitimate business
80. See Fried, supra note 10, at 423.
81. Id.
82. See Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-18(a)(3) (2003).
83. § 240.10b-18 (a)(2).
84. Rule 10b-18 and Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and
Others, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,594, 77,594 (Dec. 18, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-18).

204

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 8

reasons" are repurchases to provide the shares necessary for
"dividend reinvestment, stock option and employee stock
ownership plans, or to reduce the outstanding capital stock
following the cash sale of operating divisions or subsidiaries."85 To
meet these legitimate goals, securities laws must allow issuers to
access the market and absorb significant amounts of their common
stock on a regular basis. The release fails to note, however, that
the elimination of the block purchase exception adopted by the
revised Rule 10b-18 would force issuers, particularly small banks
and savings associations, to pursue these activities outside of the
safe harbor, which, in practice, would halt repurchases.86 Such a
drastic measure is unnecessary for financial institutions, because
existing banking regulation limits the number of shares that a bank
or savings association can issue to the amount released in the
initial offering. 7 Federal law precludes a savings association from
issuing additional shares.88 As a result, savings associations are
completely dependent upon repurchasing to meet the demands of
their stock option and incentive programs. This dependency
becomes all the more acute when one considers that the stock of
such organizations is not widely traded.89 This chilling effect is due
to the reality that issuers are reluctant, if not unwilling, to
undertake any repurchases without the certainty that their
purchases will come within the protective confines of the safe
harbor.9" Moreover, the issuer is not the only party involved in the
repurchase transaction who is nervous about the prospect of
repurchasing outside the safe harbor. Even brokerage firms, on
which the issuer relies to complete the transaction, are
uncomfortable participating in such a transaction, even though
they would not be held liable for any resulting manipulation. 9'
85. Id.
86. See America's Community Bankers' Comment to Rule 10b-18 and Purchases
of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others; SEC Release No. 33-8160
(Feb. 19, 2003) [hereinafter America's Community Bankers], at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/s75002/cmbahin1.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See supra notes 89-106 and accompanying text.
90. Davenport, supra note 60, at 7A.
91. Id.
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In adopting the proposal, the Commission neglected to
consider the reality that the elimination of the block purchase
exception will preclude a community bank or savings association
from repurchasing its shares. The Commission also failed to
address the adverse impact such a regulatory regime will have on
repurchases, such as raising the transaction costs of non-block
repurchases and diminishing the market demand for an
institution's stock.92
One reason an issuer may seek to repurchase shares of its
common stock is to reduce outstanding capital and thereby
increase its return to shareholders (ROE).93 This motivation is a
particularly important tool for a bank adjusting to life as a publicly
traded company. 94 For instance, after OceanFirst Financial
Corporation (OceanFirst) went public, its capital exceeded twenty
percent of its assets.95 OceanFirst addressed this problem through
a capital management program, the centerpiece of which was to
repurchase outstanding shares of its common stock through the
block purchase mechanism.96 Pursuant to this plan, OceanFirst
repurchased 14 million shares of its common stock. 9' During 2002,
OceanFirst repurchased approximately 1.25 million shares
exclusively through block purchases.98
Without the block exception, OceanFirst, and similarly
situated financial institutions, would have been unable to reduce
their capital levels to a manageable percentage via stock
92. See American Bankers Assoc., Comment to Rule 10b-18 and Purchases of
Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others; SEC Release No. 33-8160 (Feb
(last
18, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s75002/aba-fsr-nychal.htm
visited Feb. 7, 2004).
93. See Rule lOb-18 and Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and
Others, 67 Fed. Reg. 77594 (Dec. 18, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18).
94. See OceanFirst Financial Corp., Comment to Rule 10b-18 and Purchases of
Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others; SEC Release No. 33-8160 (Feb
18, 2003) [hereinafter OceanFirst, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s75002/
jgarbarinol.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id. The block purchase exception to the volume limitation of Rule 10b-18
aided OceanFirst in reducing its capital level from 20% prior to the initiation of the
repurchase program to a manageable 7.8% by the end of 2002. Id. Conversely, the
program facilitated the change in the company's return on equity from 6% on the eve
of the repurchase plan to 14.3% upon the completion of the exercise. Id.
98. Id.
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repurchases. On the day that the OceanFirst submitted its
comment to the Commission's proposal, the ADTV of the
company's stock was 8,000 shares, well beyond the 500 shares
proposed by the SEC as an alternative to the ADTV.9 9 Under the
New Rule, another small to moderate financial institution, UMB
Financial Corporation (UMB), would only be able to purchase .06
percent of its shares that are included in the public float. °°
OceanFirst purchased shares in blocks ranging in size from 10,000
to 50,000 shares or more, a typical range in these situations."0 '
Further, of the shares OceanFirst repurchased during 2002,
02
seventy percent were effected in blocks of 10,000 or more.
Under the new regime, OceanFirst would have been able to
conduct one of these block purchases per week, but at a cost of
sacrificing any Rule 10b-18 purchases for the rest of that trading
day. 103
One could argue that the 500 share alternative is a
sufficient balance to counter the elimination of the block
exception. But rarely will a bank's stock be so thinly-traded that
the ADTV limitation will be less than 500 shares."°4 Furthermore,
although potentially attractive in theory, the 500 share ceiling is
useless in practice because unsolicited blocks, the form that the
majority of block purchases take, brought to an issuer from
institutional investors will rarely be as small as 500 shares.10 5
In addition to assisting a financial institution in maintaining
healthy capital levels, the block exception also reduces the costs
associated with repurchasing. The block purchase exception
enables all issuers, regardless of their size and how actively their
stock is traded, to receive preferable pricing by purchasing a large

99. Id.
100. See UMB Financial Corporation, supra note 62.
101. See OceanFirst, supra note 94.
102. Id.
103. See Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 68 Fed.
Reg. 64,952, 64,960 (Nov. 17, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18).
104. See OceanFirst, supra note 94.
105. See, e.g., UMB Financial Corporation, supra note 62 (explaining that the
majority of block purchases are unsolicited bids brought to the issuer by institutional
investors).
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block of shares, thereby reducing overall transaction costs,
06
including the commission.
D.

Eliminationof the Block Exception Would Unduly Burden
Small FinancialInstitutions

The block exception is particularly attractive to small and
moderate-sized financial institutions, as well as institutional
investors.0 7 As discussed in the preceding section, the block
purchase exemption allows companies whose stock is not heavily
traded to make significant purchases of their stock over a realistic
timeframe. 01 8 Without the benefit of the exception, these
institutions will be forced to acquire small amounts of their stock
over a prolonged period of time.0 9 This unwanted effect will likely
increase market volatility, contrary to the Commission's stated
0
goal."1
Besides promoting the financial goals of banks, the block
exception also allows large investors to pursue their investment
strategies."' Generally, the institutional investor sells its holdings
in a company in the form of a block purchase." 2 Thus, the block
purchase exception accommodates institutional transactions,
alleviating the concern among large investors that an investment in
a bank or savings association stock will present liquidity issues.13
106. See America's Community Bankers, supra note 86.
107. See, e.g., UMB Financial Corporation, supra note 62 (stating that the block
exception allows UMB and companies of similar size "to administer an employee
stock ownership plan, an employee stock purchase plan, and for other appropriate
business purposes."). The UMB comment also notes that the block exception
liquidity for shareholders with large holdings - i.e., the institutional investor. Id.
108. See NBT Bancorp Corp., Comment to Rule 10b-18 and Purchases of Certain
Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others; SEC Release No. 33-8160 (Feb. 14, 2003)
[hereinafter
MBT
Bancorp.],
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s75002/
mjchewensl.txt (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
109. See id.
110. See Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 68 Fed.
Reg. 64,952, 64,952 (Nov. 17, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18).
111. See e.g., NBT Bancorp, supra note 108 (noting that the elimination of the
block exception "will scare off or keep away potential large investors who will fear
that [the issuer does] not have enough liquidity or other institutional investors to
allow for an orderly exit strategy out of [its] stock.").
112. See e.g., America's Community Bankers, supra note 86 (explaining that
"block purchases accommodate large institutional transactions.").
113. See id.
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If an institutional investor knows an issuer with a thinly traded
stock cannot engage in block transactions because of volume
limitations, the investor will probably not invest in the issuer's
security." 4 Therefore, the amendment will have a "very real, and
potentially devastating, impact on the marketability of [a small]
institution's stock," making it even more difficult for thinly traded
5
1
companies to attract investors.

1

The potential traumatic effects of the Commission's
amendment are not confined to the departure of institutional
investors. One of the stated goals of the revision is to increase
investor confidence in the stock markets." 6 Thus, one would
expect the amendment to eliminate the blanket of fog surrounding
market activities. But the practical result of the proposed reforms
will be to perpetuate investor uncertainty. From the investor's
standpoint, recognition and assessment of the impact of numerous
smaller purchases over time by an issuer will be more difficult than
that of the fewer block purchases." 7
The problem with the amendment is not limited to the fact
that it fatally disadvantages smaller banks and bank holding
companies. More importantly, the revision subjects larger banks
and bank holding companies, whose stock is traded at a higher
level, to more favorable treatment." 8 As noted above, a repeal of
the block exception would prohibit a company whose stock is not
heavily traded from making purchases of their own stock over a
realistic time-frame. Fortunately, many large bank holding
companies face a more certain future than their smaller
counterparts since the amended rule includes block purchases

114. Id.

115. Id.
116. See Rule 10b-18 and Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and
Others, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,594, 77,606 (Dec. 18, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-18).
117. Id.
118. While the repeal of the block exception bestows favorable treatment upon
larger financial institutions (the larger the institution the more heavily traded the
stock will be, resulting in a higher ADTV), the proposed amendment of the rule
governing repurchases pursuant to a merger will impact merger-minded institutions
with a greater force. See Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and
Others, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,952, 64,955 n.34 (Nov. 17, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-18).
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within the ADTV calculation and the twenty-five percent volume
limitation." 9 Due to the high volume at which many larger
20
corporation's stock is traded, their ADTV will be higher as well.
Thus, while the 500-share alternative might not assist a large issuer
in repurchasing blocks of its common stock, the issuer will at least
be able to make such purchases while remaining within its ADTV
and not exceeding the twenty-five percent volume limitation,
therefore finding itself within the protective confines of Rule 10b18's safe harbor.
Finally, the Commission's elimination of the block
exception is inconsistent with an earlier proposal by the
Commission to relax repurchase limitations during times of severe
market stress, such as the day after a suspension in trading. 2' One
reason the Commission proposed to raise the allowable volume to
100% of the ADTV the day after a suspension in trading is to
provide stability during a time of acute market volatility. 122 One
can infer from this proposal that extensive repurchasing provides
stability. Oddly, the Commission wishes to create instability by
removing block purchases from the safe harbor for issuers whose
stock is thinly-traded, only to cut all restrictions once the
instability rises to the level of distress enumerated in other
proposals. 23 Therefore, additional regulation eventually gives way
to a situation devoid of oversight and the manipulation that should
result once the New Rule becomes effective.
E.

Alternatives to the Amendment

The Commission could accomplish its desire to modernize
Rule 10b-18 to correspond to current market conditions by
bringing the definition of what constitutes a block purchase in line
119. Id.
120. ADTV is the average daily trading volume of an issuer's stock over a fourweek period. See Purchasers of Certain Securities by Issuer and Others, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-18(b)(4)(i) (2003). As a result, the greater the trading volume, the higher the
ADTV. Id.
121. See Piccioni, supra note 38, at 583-85.
122. See id. at 581 (noting that by relaxing the requirements of Rule 10b-18, the
Commission sought to "facilitate the 'reopening of fair and orderly equities
markets').
123. See id., at 583-85.
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with that of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The NYSE
and National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) define a
block as the purchase of a quantity of stock with a purchase price
of $500,000 or more, or at least 10,000 shares of stock with a
purchase price of at least $200,000, whichever is less.124 These
thresholds are twice that of Rule 10b-18's definition of a block
purchase. 25 The benefits of adopting the NYSE and NASD
standards are substantial. First, the change would address the
Commission's concern that Rule 10b-18 reflect current market
conditions. Second, and more importantly, the NYSE definition
adequately balances the competing concerns in this area: "the
need to foster market liquidity and flexibility without increasing
the potential for abusive market practices above an acceptable
level."' 126 Third, the increased threshold would provide small to
medium issuers more room to comply with the unsolicited bids
from institutional investors. 27 The latter is the most important, for
it would remedy both the possible liquidity concerns of the
institutional investor and the potential hemorrhaging in the stock
price that would result from such an investor being forced to divest
28
his shares in piecemeal fashion across the market.'
An alternative proposal would be to keep the existing
definition of a block purchase intact, include block purchases
within the ADTV calculation, but amend Rule 10b-18(b)(4)129 to

124. See Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, L.L.P., Comment to Rule 10b-18
and Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others; SEC Release
No. 33-8160 (Feb. 18, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s75002/
serothwelll.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Skadden].
125. See Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-18(b)(4) (2003). As noted above, under Rule 10b-18, a block
purchase is a quantity of stock that (i) has a purchase price of $200,000 or more; (ii)
consists of 5,000 or more shares with a purchase price of at least $50,000; (iii) is at
least 20 round lots of a security that totals at least 150% of the daily trading volume
for that security; or (iv) is at least 20 round lots of the security and totals at least .01%
of the outstanding shares of the security. See § 240.10b-18(a)(14).
126. Sullivan, supra note 74.
127. If the threshold reflected the more permissible definition of the NYSE and
NASD, issuer repurchases of a thinly-traded stock would fall within the Rule's
twenty-five percent volume limitation. As a result, the issuer could conduct the
repurchase within the rule and without relying on the block exception.
128. See NBT Bancorp Corp., supra note 108.
129. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18(b)(4).
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exclude block purchases from the volume limitation. 3 ' This
proposal incorporates the simplicity inherent in the Commission's
amendment to the manner in which an issuer calculates the
ADTV."' The alternative also recognizes that there are critically
important reasons to retain the exception-foremost among them
is addressing the hardship that will be placed upon small and
medium issuers and their shareholders if the block exception is
eliminated.'32
The New Rule adopted by the Commission was the onceper-week block exception to the volume limitation of Rule 10b18.'13 In making such a concession, the Commission seems to
recognize the obstacle created for small and medium issuers in the
initial proposal. 34 But the new exception does not alleviate the
concerns this note raises. In a classic case of form over substance,
the "exception" is meaningless for small to medium issuers who
have come to rely on the block exception as a mechanism for
pursuing legitimate business activities. 31In addition, investors who
practice trading in block form will spurn the stock of small and
medium issuers for the more heavily traded stock, which they can
liquidate in block form under the new regime.' 36 As a result, if the
Commission desires to treat all issuers equally, it should re-amend
the new rule to set a mutually agreeable level where issuers whose
stock is thinly-traded could continue to use the block exception.
Such an alternative would not favor small companies over large
because, as noted above, an issuer whose stock is traded at a high
130. See Skadden, supra note 124.
131. See supra notes 116-18.
132. See supra notes 116-18.
133. See Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 68 Fed.
Reg. 64,952, 64,960 (Nov. 17, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18.).
134. See id. at 64,959-60.
135. As noted above, the once-a-week block exception would allow an issuer to
make a block purchase of its stock once a week, provided it does not make any other
Rule-10b-18 purchases on the day it acquires the block. See Purchases of Certain
Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, 68 Fed. Reg. at 64,960. Issuers used the
original block exception to conduct legitimate business activities, such as funding
employee stock option plans, whenever such blocks became available. See UMB
Financial Corporation, supra note 62. But since the issuer is unable to predict when
the block will become available, it cannot pursue such legitimate and crucial business
activities with a mere once-a-week block exception.
136. See NBT Bancorp., supra note 108.
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level will be able to fit block purchases under the new volume
limitation. Large companies still, due to their size, retain
advantages over the issuer whose stock is traded at a
comparatively low level, but at least in the eyes of federal
securities laws they would be equal.
IV. CONCLUSION

In an era where corporate malfeasance has significantly
undermined investors' confidence in the integrity of securities
markets, the Commission should be applauded for acting to
reverse such a dangerous tide. Although the Commission has
selected the right time to act and the right rule, regrettably, it has
selected the wrong method.
Since its adoption in 1982, the underlying principle of Rule
10b-18 has been that "issuer purchases are beneficial for
companies, shareholders and investors generally and should be
permitted to continue freely at all times subject only to compliance
with the conditions of the Rule."' 37 Admittedly, this premise
should not apply when confronted with persuasive evidence that
repurchases made under the particular circumstances of the Rule
cause substantial harm to investors.'38 Nevertheless, the
Commission has failed to provide evidence in support of such a
change in policy. For instance, in the release of the proposed rule,
the Commission's proposal fails to cite any evidence that the block
exception has led to market manipulation in the twenty plus years
since the safe harbor came into existence. The release does cite
two studies that have concluded that block transactions can affect
share prices. 3 9 The proposition that such purchases can affect
market prices does not amount to evidence of fraudulent behavior
or market manipulation. Without the block exception, repurchases
will be conducted over a longer period of time and in smaller
amounts; but these transactions too have the potential to affect
137. Sullivan, supra note 74.
138. Id.

139. See Rule 10b-18 and Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and
Others, 68 Fed. Reg. 64, 952, 64,959 n.78 (Nov. 17, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-18).
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market price. 4 ° Moreover, the current state of affairs is not one
where issuers are free to repurchase without limitations and
oversight. Therefore, the Commission should retain the existing
regulatory framework, and reserve the punitive aspects of the
proposal for a future where evidence of clear harm actually exists.
Perhaps the best proposal the Commission could consider
is to leave the existing regulatory regime untouched. For over
twenty years issuers have relied on the safe harbor and the block
purchase exception. Forcing financial institutions to walk away
from this reliance would jeopardize existing business plans and the
very existence of the community bank and savings association.
JAMES

140. See id.
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